v/vlib/crypto/hmac/hmac.v

45 lines
1.3 KiB
V
Raw Normal View History

2020-10-14 12:25:58 +02:00
// HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication implemented in v
// implementation based on https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2104
module hmac
import crypto.internal.subtle
2020-10-14 12:25:58 +02:00
const (
2022-04-15 14:35:35 +02:00
ipad = []u8{len: 256, init: 0x36} // TODO is 256 enough??
opad = []u8{len: 256, init: 0x5C}
npad = []u8{len: 256, init: 0}
2020-10-14 12:25:58 +02:00
)
// new returns a HMAC byte array, depending on the hash algorithm used.
2022-04-15 14:35:35 +02:00
pub fn new(key []u8, data []u8, hash_func fn ([]u8) []u8, blocksize int) []u8 {
mut b_key := []u8{}
2020-10-14 12:25:58 +02:00
if key.len <= blocksize {
b_key = key.clone() // TODO: remove .clone() once https://github.com/vlang/v/issues/6604 gets fixed
} else {
b_key = hash_func(key)
}
if b_key.len < blocksize {
b_key << hmac.npad[..blocksize - b_key.len]
2020-10-14 12:25:58 +02:00
}
2022-04-15 14:35:35 +02:00
mut inner := []u8{}
for i, b in hmac.ipad[..blocksize] {
2020-10-14 12:25:58 +02:00
inner << b_key[i] ^ b
}
inner << data
inner_hash := hash_func(inner)
2022-04-15 14:35:35 +02:00
mut outer := []u8{cap: b_key.len}
for i, b in hmac.opad[..blocksize] {
2020-10-14 12:25:58 +02:00
outer << b_key[i] ^ b
}
outer << inner_hash
digest := hash_func(outer)
return digest
}
// equal compares 2 MACs for equality, without leaking timing info.
// Note: if the lengths of the 2 MACs are different, probably a completely different
// hash function was used to generate them => no useful timing information.
2022-04-15 14:35:35 +02:00
pub fn equal(mac1 []u8, mac2 []u8) bool {
return subtle.constant_time_compare(mac1, mac2) == 1
}